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Mass vaccination against measles has successfully lowered the incidence of the disease and
has changed the epidemic pattern from a roughly biennial cycle to an irregular sequence of
outbreaks. A possible explanation for this sequence of outbreaks is that the vaccinated
population is protected by solid herd immunity. If so, we would expect to see the fraction of
susceptible individuals remaining below an epidemic threshold. An alternative explanation is
the occurrence of occasional localised lapses in herd immunity that allow for major outbreaks
in areas with a low vaccine coverage. In that case, we would expect the fraction of susceptible
individuals to exceed an epidemic threshold before outbreaks occur. These two explanations
for the irregular sequence of measles outbreaks can be tested against observations of both the
fraction of susceptible individuals and infection attack rates.
Methods and Findings
We have estimated both the fraction of susceptible individuals at the start of each epidemic
year and the infection attack rates for each epidemic year in the Netherlands over a 28-y period.
During this period the vaccine coverage averaged 93%, and there was no sustained measles
transmission. Several measles outbreaks occurred in communities with low vaccine coverage,
and these ended without intervention. We show that there is a clear threshold value for the
fraction of susceptible individuals, below which only minor outbreaks occurred, and above
which both minor and major outbreaks occurred. A precise, quantitative relationship exists
between the fraction of susceptible individuals in excess of this threshold and the infection
attack rate during the major outbreaks.
Conclusion
In populations with a high but heterogeneous vaccine coverage, measles transmission can
be interrupted without establishing solid herd immunity. When infection is reintroduced, a
major outbreak can occur in the communities with low vaccine coverage. During such a major
outbreak, each additional susceptible individual in excess of the threshold is associated with
almost two additional infections. This quantitative relationship offers potential for anticipating
both the likelihood and size of future major outbreaks when measles transmission has been
interrupted.
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Measles is one of the most contagious diseases of humans,
and an important cause of childhood deaths. The global
effort to reduce measles mortality aims to achieve routine
measles vaccination coverage of at least 90% in every district
throughout the world. So far, this effort has resulted in a
dramatic decline in deaths from measles [1]. The high
vaccination coverages have changed the epidemic pattern
from a roughly biennial cycle to an irregular sequence of
outbreaks [2–4]. A proper understanding of the size and
timing of these outbreaks is a prerequisite for adequate
monitoring of a vaccination programme, and essential for
assessing the risk of future measles outbreaks.
The size of an outbreak depends on both the fraction of
susceptible individuals in the population and on chance
events in the transmission process [5]. The fraction of
susceptible individuals determines the expected size of an
outbreak. Already in 1927, Kermack and McKendrick
predicted that there should exist a critical threshold level
for the fraction of susceptible individuals below which
introduction of infection can only lead to minor outbreaks
[6]. This so-called threshold theorem [7] underlies the
concept of herd immunity, and it explains why it is possible
to eradicate an infectious agent even without achieving
complete vaccine coverage [8,9]. Variability in the size of
outbreaks arises due to chance events in the transmission
process. This variability becomes very large when the fraction
of susceptible individuals is close to the epidemic threshold
level [4,10]. When the fraction of susceptible individuals
exceeds the threshold level, chance events determine whether
a minor or a major outbreak will occur. The probability that
the outbreak will be a major one increases with the fraction
of susceptible individuals in excess of the threshold [5,11]. In
their 1927 paper, Kermack and McKendrick showed that
when the proportion of susceptible individuals is only slightly
above the threshold level, almost two infections occur per
susceptible individual in excess of the threshold level during a
major outbreak [6]; this so-called second threshold theorem
has been useful in calculating expected outbreak sizes [7,12].
Thus, the epidemic threshold for fraction of susceptible
individuals marks a bifurcation in expected infection attack
rates from only minor to both minor and major outbreaks,
where the infection attack rate during major outbreaks is
almost twice the excess fraction of susceptible individuals
(Figure 1A).
Most observational studies on outbreak sizes in highly
vaccinated populations have relied on two assumptions: ﬁrst,
the fraction of susceptible individuals is uniform throughout
the population, and, second, the fraction of susceptible
individuals remains below the epidemic threshold [3,4,13]. If
these assumptions are met, the population is protected by
solid herd immunity and no major outbreaks can occur. A
simple one-to-one relationship exists between the observed
infection attack rate and the fraction of susceptible individ-
uals in the population (Figure 1B). This one-to-one relation-
ship makes it possible to derive several epidemic variables of
interest from observed outbreak sizes [3,4,10]. For example,
countries and regions with elimination strategies for measles
have been advised to monitor the average outbreak size as an
indicator of ‘‘elimination status’’ [14]: smaller outbreaks are
indicative of fewer susceptible individuals in a homogeneous
population that is protected by solid herd immunity.
Many countries and regions have a heterogeneous distri-
bution of the fraction of susceptible individuals [15]. This
heterogeneity can be due to religious communities that
Figure 1. The Epidemic Threshold Concept
(A) Expected infection attack rates during measles outbreaks in an
idealised homogeneously mixing population.
(B) Expected infection attack rates during measles outbreaks in a
population protected by solid herd immunity.
(C) Expected infection attack rates during measles outbreaks in a
heterogeneous population consisting of a small community embedded
in a larger population. The expectations are calculated for a stochastic
‘‘susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered’’ (SEIR) model, with measles
basic reproduction number R0 ¼ 17 [2], and ten imported measles cases
per year. The population structure is as reported for the Netherlands,
where a small community of 300 000 persons with a variable fraction of
susceptible individuals exists in a larger population of 15 million persons
with a fraction of susceptible individuals of 0.043 [21].
Dark blue markers correspond to major outbreaks; light blue markers
correspond to minor outbreaks. The solid gray line indicates the
approximation, near the threshold, of the infection attack rate: two
infections occur per susceptible individual in excess of the threshold.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020316.g001
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Measles Epidemic Thresholdrefrain from vaccination (for example, the Amish in the
United States of America [16]) or due to different vaccination
programmes (for example, failure to implement additional
vaccinations in the Sa ˜o Paulo region of Brazil [17]). The
threshold concept, although often illustrated for an idealised
homogeneous population, also applies with a few minor
modiﬁcations to a heterogeneous population. In a simple
heterogeneous population, consisting of a community with
many susceptible individuals embedded in a population with
few susceptible individuals, one still recognises an epidemic
threshold for the average fraction of susceptible individuals
in the entire population. And when a major outbreak hits the
community with many susceptible individuals, approximately
two cases occur per susceptible individual in excess of this
population average threshold (Figure 1C). As a consequence,
there is no longer a simple one-to-one relationship between
the observed infection attack rate and the fraction of
susceptible individuals in the population.
To our knowledge, there are no direct observations that
show the precise nature of the relation between the fraction
of susceptible individuals and infection attack rate during the
irregular measles outbreaks that are characteristic for highly
vaccinated populations. However, such observations could
shed light on how one should interpret observed infection
attack rates, and how to assess the risk of future measles
outbreaks once endemic transmission has been interrupted.
To overcome this deﬁciency, we have investigated the relation
between the fraction of susceptible individuals and the
infection attack rate for measles outbreaks over a 28-y period
in the Dutch population. The Dutch data are ideally suited
for an ecological study of measles outbreaks in a real,
heterogeneous population: endemic measles transmission
during this period was frequently interrupted in between
the measles outbreaks, while the vaccination coverages and
birth rates remained almost constant [18,19].
Methods
Study Population and Data Sources
Measles notiﬁcation and vaccination began in 1976 in the
Netherlands. From 1976 to 1987 a plain live attenuated
measles vaccine was administered at the age of 14 mo. Since
1987, two doses of a combined measles, mumps, and rubella
vaccine have been recommended at age 14 mo and 9 y. The
vaccine coverage in the Netherlands has remained above 90%
since 1978 (average coverage at 14 mo was 93%, range 91%–
96%; data obtained from the Dutch Medical Inspectorate of
Health). However, some municipalities reported vaccination
coverages near 50%, owing to a high percentage of residents
who refrained from vaccination on religious grounds. The
size of the religious community in the Netherlands that
refrains from vaccination is estimated at 300 000 persons,
approximately 2% of the overall population [20]. The total
population size increased from 13.7 million in 1976 to 16.3
million in 2004; the annual number of births varied between a
lowest value of 170 000, recorded in 1983, and a highest value
of 207 000, recorded in 2000 (data obtained from Statistics
Netherlands, http://statline.cbs.nl/statweb). From 1976 to
2004, a total of 12 407 measles cases were notiﬁed; 96% of
the measles cases that were notiﬁed from 1988 to 2004 were
not vaccinated, mostly for religious and other ideological
reasons (data obtained from the Dutch Medical Inspectorate
of Health and from the National Surveillance System). Since
1976, two serological surveillance studies have been con-
ducted in the Netherlands. In 1987, serum was obtained from
an age-stratiﬁed sample of 2 041 inhabitants of the town of
Nijmegen, and of these a fraction of 0.053 (standard error
0.015) tested negative for measles-speciﬁc antibodies; in 1996,
serum was obtained from an age-stratiﬁed sample of 8 303
individuals from the Dutch population, and of these a
fraction of 0.043 (standard error 0.002) tested negative for
measles-speciﬁc antibodies [21].
Data Analysis
We chose to measure time in ‘‘epidemic years’’ that started
on 1 September and ended on 31 August. Around this time of
the year the measles incidence was low, and often the
transmission chain was interrupted. The various data sources
provide information on a period that encompasses 28 such
epidemic years, starting 1 September 1976 and ending 31
August 2004.
The infection attack rate was deﬁned as the fraction of the
population that became infected during an epidemic year.
We estimated the number of measles infections per epidemic
year as the number of reported cases divided by the reporting
rates; the procedure for estimating these reporting rates is
described below. The uncertainty introduced into the
estimated infection attack rates due to incomplete reporting
was small (for example, the 95% bootstrap interval for
infection attack rate in 1976 was 72 3 10
 4 to 78 3 10
 4; the
95% bootstrap interval for infection attack rate in 2002 was 1
3 10
 6 to 8 3 10
 6).
Following the balance equation approach used by Fine and
Clarkson [22] and Finkensta ¨dt and Grenfell [23], we estimated
the number of susceptible individuals by taking the number
of susceptible individuals in the previous year, adding the
recruitment of new susceptible individuals by birth over the
epidemic year (after waning of maternal antibodies), and
subtracting the depletion of susceptible individuals over the
epidemic year by vaccination (using an estimated vaccine
efﬁcacy of 97%), infection, or death. We estimated the
number of susceptible individuals at the start of the mass
vaccination, together with reporting rates, by a weighted
least-squares ﬁt of the fraction of susceptible individuals to
the observations from the serological surveys in 1987 and
1996; adjustments, in which updated estimates of the fraction
of susceptible individuals were used, were made until
convergence was reached [19]. The estimated fraction of
susceptible individuals at the start of the mass vaccination
was 0.05, which is within the theoretical expected range of
0.04–0.07 for a population in endemic equilibrium (assuming
that the measles basic reproduction number is within the
range 15–25; cf. [2,8]).
We estimated the measles reporting rates by a weighted
least-squares ﬁt of the fraction of susceptible individuals to
the observations from the serological surveys in 1987 and
1996; the weighting factors were based on the reported
standard errors for the results from these surveys [19]. We
estimated that a fraction 0.024 of all measles infections were
reported over the years 1976–1980, and we estimated that this
reporting rate increased to a fraction 0.067 over the 1999–
2000 epidemic year. These estimates were reassuringly close
to other, independent estimates of the measles reporting
rates in the Netherlands: 0.028 over the years 1976–1980 (van
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epidemic year for a population served by a large general-
practice group [24]. The derivation of realistic estimates for
the reporting rates suggests that processes other than birth,
vaccination, infection, or death—such as, for example,
immigration or hypothesized waning of vaccine-induced
immunity [25]—have contributed little to the number of
susceptible individuals in the population.
Having reconstructed for each epidemic year a proportion
of susceptible individuals and an infection attack rate, we
classiﬁed epidemic years as either a minor or a major
outbreak. We separated the epidemic years into two clusters
by ﬁtting two bivariate normal distributions. The distribution
with the lowest mean infection attack rate represented a
cluster of minor outbreaks, and the distribution with the
highest mean infection attack rate represented a cluster of
major outbreaks. We classiﬁed each epidemic year according
to its relative likelihood of belonging to the cluster of major
outbreaks. Epidemic years with a relative likelihood below 0.5
were classiﬁed as minor outbreaks, and epidemic years with a
relative likelihood of 0.5 or higher were classiﬁed as major
outbreaks. The relative likelihood of belonging to the cluster
of major outbreaks was used as a weight for the subsequent
regression analysis.
To determine the value of a threshold, if present, we used a
weighted linear regression of infection attack rate on fraction
of susceptible individuals. The intercept of the regression line
with the axis for fraction of susceptible individuals gave the
threshold value. The slope of the regression line gave the
number of additional cases for each additional susceptible
individual in excess of the threshold value.
Results
We compared the time series of the fraction of susceptible
individuals (Figure 2A) with the time series of infection attack
rates (Figure 2B). Major outbreaks occurred when the
fraction of susceptible individuals was relatively high at the
start of the epidemic year. When major outbreaks were
absent, the fraction of susceptible individuals steadily
increased. Statistical analysis of the fraction of susceptible
individuals and the attack rates revealed a bifurcating
relation with a clear threshold level for the fraction of
susceptible individuals near 0.043 (Figure 2C). Below the
threshold level only minor outbreaks occurred. The infection
attack rates during minor outbreaks tended to increase when
the fraction of susceptible individuals was closer to the
threshold level. Above this threshold level both minor and
major outbreaks occurred. The likelihood of a major out-
break increased sharply with the fraction of susceptible
individuals in excess of the threshold level. The size of a
major outbreak also increased with the fraction of susceptible
individuals in excess of the threshold level. During a major
outbreak, the number of cases per excess susceptible
individual was 1.61 (95% conﬁdence interval 1.43–1.79).
Discussion
The irregular sequence of measles outbreak sizes reveals a
clear epidemic threshold level: major outbreaks occur only if
the fraction of susceptible individuals in the entire popula-
tion is above this threshold level. To our knowledge, this is the
most detailed observation in a human population of such a
bifurcation from only minor towards both minor and major
outbreaks.
The observations (Figure 2C) agree remarkably well with
theoretical predictions for measles outbreaks in a heteroge-
neous population (see Figure 1C). The observed outbreaks at
the population level are suggestive of an underlying hetero-
Figure 2. Observed Measles Outbreaks in the Netherlands, from 1
September 1976 to 31 August 2004
(A) The fraction of individuals susceptible to measles on 1 September of
each year.
(B) Infection attack rate of measles during each epidemic year from 1
September to 31 August.
(C) Relation between fraction of susceptible individuals and attack rate.
Dark blue markers correspond to major outbreaks; light blue markers
correspond to minor outbreaks. Solid gray lines indicate the maximum
likelihood values for infection attack rate; broken gray lines indicate the
likelihood support region. The dotted yellow line in (A) and (C) indicates
the threshold value for susceptible individuals below which solid herd
immunity is achieved.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020316.g002
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most measles cases during the outbreaks were reported in
communities with a low vaccine coverage [18,20]. The
agreement between observations and theoretical predictions
also suggests that the observed increase of infection attack
rate with fraction of susceptible individuals may hold for
other populations as well. Earlier studies have already
recognised that clusters of persons refraining from vacci-
nation may interfere with elimination of the disease [18] and
pose an increased risk to others who comply with vaccination
[26]. Our ﬁndings make precise why refusal of measles vaccine
is a public health threat: one additional person who refrains
from vaccination is associated with more than one—almost
two—infected persons in subsequent major outbreaks.
We propose that the irregularities in size and timing of
measles outbreaks in highly vaccinated populations can be
understood within the familiar concept of the epidemic
threshold. Previous approaches have relied on a statistical
description of outbreak sizes, and derived their justiﬁcation
from a solid herd immunity in a homogeneous population
[3,4]. In contrast, the estimated time series of susceptible
individuals and attack rates, taken together, indicate that
herd immunity may show occasional, localised lapses that
allow for major outbreaks within communities with low
vaccine coverage. The threshold concept reveals how the
observed infection attack rates reﬂect the dynamics in the
fraction of susceptible individuals, even when vaccination
coverage is distributed variably throughout the population.
Great care should be taken in interpreting a time series of
measles case notiﬁcations in the absence of a corresponding
time series of the fraction of susceptible individuals. The
occurrence of only a few measles cases over a long period of
several years does not necessarily signal that solid herd
immunity is achieved. It may alternatively signal an increasing
risk of a future major measles outbreak. The picture of the
bifurcating attack rates (see Figure 2C) helps to understand
why. For example, during the years 2000–2003, few measles
cases were reported, because the fraction of susceptible
individuals remained below the epidemic threshold level and
only minor outbreaks were reported. Since 2003, the thresh-
old level has been exceeded. Only minor outbreaks have
occurred because the probability of a major outbreak has
remained small. However, if the fraction of susceptible
individuals continues to increase over time as it did in
previous years (see Figure 2A), both the probability of a
major outbreak and the expected size of such an outbreak will
increase over time. A major outbreak can be averted only if
additional vaccination programmes target the communities
at risk, or if import of measles cases into those communities is
prevented. The information on both case notiﬁcations and
the fraction of susceptible individuals can be further analysed
by a mathematical model of transmission, or a data-driven
model, to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative interven-
tion strategies [8,12,23].
Once the current global effort to reduce measles mortality
has achieved sustainable high measles vaccine coverage,
many more countries and regions will experience irregular
measles outbreaks. Our ﬁndings have important implica-
tions with respect to the design of disease-surveillance
systems in populations with high vaccination coverages.
First, it would be wise to strengthen the existing surveillance
systems by estimating or monitoring the changes in the
fraction of susceptible individuals over time, and by
conducting serological surveys as part of that endeavour.
Second, whenever the transmission chain has been inter-
rupted, the estimated change in the fraction of susceptible
individuals can be used to assess the risk of future major
measles outbreaks.
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Background Measles is a highly infectious, unpleasant disease that can
cause death, especially in people who have low immunity or who are ill
from other causes. For many years vaccination has been available, and in
most Western populations there is a high coverage of vaccination;
despite this vaccination outbreaks of measles do occur.
Why Was This Study Done? The authors wanted to understand why
outbreaks of measles occur in vaccinated populations, particularly how
the rates of vaccination affected the chances of an outbreak occurring,
and what the effect of people being unvaccinated was.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? They looked at vaccination
records between 1 September 1976 and 31 August 2004 in the
Netherlands, a highly vaccinated population for which coverage has
remained above 90% since 1978. They found that between 1976 and
2004, a total of 12 407 measles cases were reported; 96% of the measles
cases that were reported from 1988 to 2004 were in people who were
not vaccinated (mostly for religious and other ideological reasons). Over
a number of years they compared the number of people who could
potentially get measles with the number who actually did. They found
that only when the number of people who could potentially get measles
exceeded a certain level was there a chance of a major outbreak, and
they showed that one additional person who refrains from vaccination is
associated with more than one—almost two—infected persons in
subsequent major outbreaks.
What Do These Findings Mean? It has long been known that
vaccination rates should be kept high. This paper attempts to answer
the questions, when is ‘‘high’’ high enough, and how bad is it if it is a
little lower? The paper shows that one additional person who refrains
from vaccination is associated with almost two infected persons in
subsequent major outbreaks. The authors also suggest how surveillance
can be enhanced to detect whether the rates of vaccination are high
enough and suggest that there should be monitoring of the proportion
of susceptible people and that health officials should ensure that this
proportion should not increase. Refusal of measles vaccine could be
considered a public health threat because of the effects of an
unvaccinated individual on the rest of the population—that is, the
chance of the epidemic spreading.
Where Can I Get More Information Online? MedlinePlus has
information on measles and the measles vaccine:
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/measles.html
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has a Web page on
the history of measles, with links to other information:
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/diseases/measles/history.htm
The World Health Organization has information on measles including in
developing countries:
http://www.who.int/topics/measles/en/
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